While the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) developed by Norton and Kaplan has gained global prominence as a management tool and there is qualitative accounting literature that discusses the benefits of the Board BSC, there is limited empirical evidence that examines the use of the Board BSC. We surveyed Chairs of large public companies to determine the extent to which they use the Board BSC and the reasons why. Our findings suggest that the Board BSC is currently not a widely used technique by Boards of Directors. We also found that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 wasn't an influencing factor for those boards that are using the Board BSC.
Boards of directors cannot afford to be ineffective. Security laws, Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations hold Boards of Directors accountable for corporate governance. Boards of directors play a major role in reducing the principle-agent problem. First, the Board sets strategic goals for the corporation. While not developing specific plans, the board points out a clear direction in which it wishes management to pursue. Second, the Board monitors the implementation of the strategic plan. The Board ensures that management makes the best use of its resources.
Third, the Board selects, guides, and motivates top management and oversees how management serves the long-term interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. Meanwhile, Directors support top management by sharing their knowledge, insights, and experience. Finally, the Board ensures the corporation's compliance with the law and high ethical standards. Kaplan and Nagel (2003) We mailed the questionnaire (please refer to Appendix A) to the chairs of the Boards of the top 662 public companies. We received 20 replies, which is a three percent response rate. Out of the 20 replies, ten respondents stated that they could not participate in the study due to company policy. Eight indicated that they do not use BSC to assess board perfonnance. Only two respondents stated that they use the Board BSC. One Board uses BSC for self-assessment and another Board uses a version of a Board BSC.
On average, the respondents have 14.6 years of experience as a director and 9.1 years of experience as the chair of the Board. They serve on 2.1 Boards at the same time. Two of the respondents also sit on the Audit Committee.
Respondents cited three reasons for not adopting Board BSC: (1) 
Learning
In tenns of learning and growth, both Boards aim to have a plan for the succession of CEO and senior management. They also want to improve the composition of the Board. One further aim is to improve the skills and knowledge of the Board. Both Boards evaluate skills and qualifications of directors, examine the diversity of the Board in tenns of race and gender, and establish training programs. One Board goes further to require a job description for CEO, prepare an annual report on succession planning, identify an interim CEO, examine Directors' financial literacy, use executive search firms to identify potential board nominees, and have new Board members evaluate programs.
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WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED
We expected to see a spillover effect from corporate management's use of BSC to using BSC for the boards on which these managers serve. The extremely low response rate for our survey may indicate that this effect
has not yet taken place or that the Chairs of the Boards were too busy to respond to the survey. The low response rate is a limitation of our study and accordingly, we can't generalize our findings. Based on the responses, Board members seem to be unfamiliar with the BSC system which would suggest that further educational efforts are necessary for board members to understand how Board BSC can make them more efficient and effective. Table 1 provides information (companies and products) that boards can examine in evaluating whether to implement Board 
